INTERCULTURAL POTENTIAL OF ARTISTIC COMMUNICATION

Pier Paolo BELLINI

Department of Human Sciences, Sociology and Education, University of Molise, Campobasso, Italy

Abstract: *Our contribution wants to deepen four aspects of the artistic experience: a) Art is a "language" and, as such, it shares characteristics, conditions and potentialities of all other languages. Therefore, we can consider it as a special type of "communication"; b) In particular, and perhaps even in a stronger way, artistic communication is based on use of "pieces" of reality (objects, concepts, shapes, sounds, movements, etc.) associated with the idea that they «can be seen as expressing, or representing something else» (Griswold 1994, it. transl. 1997: 25); c) Artistic communication appears as a phenomenon with strong relational implications: artwork is born as necessity to restore a non-superficial link between people; d) This particular urgency of sociability takes form in a typical communicative dynamic able to be "translated" in a totally own way, easily crossing linguistic barriers of any particular culture. Examples of empirical applications of these principles in a particular intercultural context, (the Bologna's prison) are shown.*

Keywords*: artistic communication; denotation and connotation; sense and signification; intercultural communication; pre-cultural background*

1. "ARTISTIC" COMMUNICATION

"Art is a communication and signification phenomenon, and as such can be examined" (Calabrese, 1986:VI). The most distinctive features of the artistic language must be identified, in our opinion, in both the way of using symbols (i.e. codes) and interpreting them (in recipients), as well as in a special type of "noise" related to "interpretive filters". Recent currents relate the communicability of an artwork to its inner qualities, in its functioning mechanisms, in particular to its symbolic nature. In this case, the discriminatory aspect of the artistic act would be the particular "symbolic action", which «is a peculiar way to "talk", that sets it apart from common as scientific language» (Calabrese, 1986:16).

Mead has already said that what distinguishes human from animal communication is exactly the use of symbols itself. In fact, "animals communicate through "natural signs" without requiring any interpretation, but a mechanism of stimulus-response" (Gattamorta, 2006: 110); men instead, using "significant symbols", cannot understand (through instinctive reaction) complex meanings that require "interpretation".

For our investigation it is functional to adhere on the distinction (more or less accepted by all)

where there are two broad categories of symbols that work according to "closed" or "open" trajectories. Now, we can agree with Jiranek (1987:80) when he states that «all of the contents of art are open systems». In other words, we can say that the artistic symbol can be identified as one arrangement, process, system in which the "back" ends in a certain vagueness, with a not obvious, forced and not even unique connection between signifier and signified. The artistic language reaches a level of "opening" wider than normal and daily interpersonal communication. In the language of art, therefore, is exacerbated one of the components present in any communication processes, we often forget: communication is always (at various levels) an "unlikely" process to come out. As such it is the result of several "translations-traditions-betrayals" of a life, the communication cannot be compared to a simple "transport" of "informative" material and therefore it implies a particular "performative" activity of the reader.

It is obvious to everyone that human communication dynamics are mostly built on the most powerful symbolic system by the referential point of view, namely verbal language: unlike animals, humans are able to "give each thing its name", therefore indicating with pinpoint accuracy every aspect of material or imagined reality.

Nevertheless, it is equally clear that non-verbal languages continue to maintain their effectiveness and, often, their central role in human communication dynamics, provoking the question of why men continue to use non-verbal communication, "since they have the ability to use, to communicate, something much more elaborate and complex as language" (Attili & Ricci-Bitti 1983:10).

The most immediate answer to this question comes from everyday experience: "The different forms of non-verbal communication are more effective and reliable in expressing emotions, attitudes and interpersonal relationships" (Gili & Colombo, 2012:291). The need to use non-verbal languages emerges also in situations where the referentiality (that is, the will to indicate something clear and precise, with an intentionality in turn clear and precise) is not the most appropriate strategy: we want to say that there are situations where clear intention collides with the ambiguity or the polysemic richness of the object or with the opacity of our conscience or our will.

Whatever the motivation for the use of non-verbal languages (which are the main codes of the artistic communication) they present themselves as irreducibly more polysemic than the verbal ones: the only exception is the poetic (or creative) language that attempts precisely to get rid of any residual burden of referentiality.

2. NOISE AS A RESOURCE

The opportunities for a creative misunderstanding are offered voluntarily by the author, who sows (we will deepen it) the story of "blanks" to be filled, and the code itself, as well as the used terms can multiply these alternative readings. We now ask, what are the dynamics by which these opportunities are normally used by the reader? What logic such a process is permitted or provided by? Linguistic, psycholinguistic, logic and sociology are supported effectively by a useful distinction between connotation and denotation.

Jauss, with the School of Konstanz, considers reception as an "updating of outdating", which happens «whenever the reader fills in the blanks» (Iser, 1978/1987:249). These exact "blanks" are the ones that work "as a kind of hinge on which the whole text-reader relationship rotates" (Iser, 1978/1987:249). Along this direction of textual analysis, Umberto Eco (1979: 52) uses the popular metaphor of "lazy (or economic) mechanism that lives on the surplus of meaning introduced by the recipient".

From the foregoing, it is evident that the artistic communication always requires a

significant and decisive intervention by the reader (on this it is based what is called "reception theory"). With the intervention of this "second author" increases the likelihood of misinterpretation, of misunderstanding, of "noise". Gadamer (1960, it. transl. 1995:177) notes that "when two men meet and communicate with each other, they always represent two different worlds, two points of view and two images of the world that compare each other". For this reason, it is comprehensible that the two poles of a communicative relationship can start out from inhomogeneous codes and that this limited ability in the use of codes can generate misunderstanding. However, it happens the same, (and this is what we are more interested in) "to other emotions and feelings, such as love or affection, or to the experience that can come out from artistic expressiveness" (Gili, 2007:156).

For this reason, since «the works of the imagination are in the form of complex networks, consisting of repetitions and variations, they are full of what information theory brands as "noise"»️ (McGann, 2001/2002:193). First of all we will focus on what are the basic principles of this theory and then we will report how the noise becomes an indispensable resource in artistic communication.

For the mathematical theory of information of Shannon and Weaver, noise must be considered as the whole factors that threaten, hinder, imperil, distort communication. Therefore, the maximum of "informativeness" of a message depends on whether the code is the most possible unique and unambiguous one and it implies a "closure". As a result, between information and noise there is a relationship of inverse proportionality: "If this model can answer to the communication among machines, it is much more problematic when it is applied to human communication" (Gili, 2007:180).

In fact, here approaching the heart of our interest, "for many other types of human communication, information and noise are not contradictory or opposite terms" (Gili, 2007:181). Iser (1971/1989:46) had already realized that in some cases you might voluntarily "decrease the denotation of a message/text in favour of a greater connotation". Such specific cases are identified in the aesthetic communication, in literary, musical and artistic works, where ambiguity and polysemy are not only a limit, but also a wealth: they stimulate and require the "productivity" and "interpretative cooperation" of the recipient. We are, therefore, in the presence of

a derived and latent meaning, a "double meaning", that the issuer can show or hide while the recipient

can discover and affirm beyond the original intention of the issuer (Gili, 2007:182).

Artistic communication flows carefully avoiding the two opposite banks of in one side the "obvious" and in the other the "incomprehensible". There is the constant risk of moving too far from the ideal line that is the only terrain in which artistic communication can exist. In fact there are limits beyond which the ambiguity of a message becomes pure noise and it does not communicate anything. While, there are also limits beyond which the displeasure kills aesthetics, because it resets the "interest" of the reader and it leads to a simple and immediate consumption.

Art is therefore a "controlled noise" useful to get out of what you already know. Basically this is what distinguishes it from scientific discourse or everyday conversation, which perceive the noise as a problem, essentially with a negative meaning. Now, the operation of the imagination, as the writer Alberto Moravia called it, can be clear and rational, but it is always a bit ambiguous; however,

> science is not so: if it states one thing, it is that and that's it. This is the kind of language that ensures to the literary work the ambiguity which art can not do anything without (Camon, 1973:21).

3. DENOTATION AND CONNOTATION

If, therefore, any cultural object "tells a story" (Griswold, 1994/1997:26), we must say that the reconstruction of the story is not a mechanical process, or a predictable and unique one. In fact, many factors are involved in offering possible variants, variations, deviations. Among them, first of all, the polysemic richness of the terms used and the particular way they are ordered by.

Especially after the analysis of de Saussure, it has become a custom to consider the denotation as a sort of "first degree of signification" that has «universal characteristics (the same meaning for everyone) and objectivity (the referents are true and they do not offer themselves to evaluations)» (McQuail, 1987/1996:32), an immediate, unambiguous and explicit symbol.

The connotation, however, concerns the second level of meaning, the accessory one, implicit, unspoken in the word: "The circle of other meanings that can be brought into relation with it" (Marothy 1980/1987:120) and finds its breeding ground in the "reaction of the lived experience" of the reader in the impact with the text. In other words, the reconstruction of the connotative meaning of a symbol asks the receiver

to risk his/her existential experience. The expression "the lemon is yellow" is essentially denotative: the lemon is yellow for all, regardless of previous experience. The only cultural precondition is the conventional sharing (typical of a social group) of the use of the term "yellow" arbitrarily connected to that particular type of interpersonal visual perception. The expression "I'll see you at the bar" is, instead, essentially connotative: to understand it, in fact, we need to go fish out the particular experience of "that" bar, an experience shared by sender and receiver. If not, the latter would be forced to walk the denotative way and he would find himself at all the bars of the city in search of the sender.

The connotation, therefore, is an evident strategy of synthesis of interaction between the individual level and the collective one: in fact, it consists of an "internal rooting" (his/her own experience, history and memory, tastes and inclinations) but also and simultaneously an "external rooting", that is the story, the sensitivity, the beliefs of the socio-cultural context in which one is likely to operate and evaluate. This rooting takes the cases of "collective imagination". It is interesting to note that with the passage of time, even the external rooting tends to become internal, to be perceived therefore as a personal, individual, own feeling of things.

4. THE READER AS CO-AUTHOR

Recently, art sociology has applied to aesthetic fruition what in the field of mass media communication has been called the "reception theory". Starting from the studies of the Birmingham School, the interest of scholars focuses on the fact, previously underestimated, that the outcome of communication is strongly linked to the "activity" of the recipient. This trend quickly found fertile ground in the field of art, ready to receive it favourably. In fact, for a long time they were aware of the fact that «every work of art, once completed, exists as entity endowed with meaning, regardless the personal life of its creator» (Schutz, 1976/1996:103).

In the artistic field, this "risk" of communication, however, is perceived, in different times and different ways, such as an "opportunity", as a resource: and so we should not be surprised when a discerning reader discovers, "in the writings of others, perfections that stand outside of those which the author has put and wanted, and lends them richer meanings and images" (Montaigne, 1580/1982:148). More recently Ingarden denied that the interpretation of the author should be a

valid yardstick, claiming the existence of a transcendence of the meaning of the work compared to the intention of the author himself (Borio and Garda 1989: 21); and so the public can find what it wants into the work, even what the author did not want: "It is a betrayal, of course, but a creative betrayal (Escarpit", 1958/1977:108).

Every time we re-read a text, we re-actualize it and every time we become "authors" of a "creative misunderstanding" able to charge certain cultural products of "meanings that, in another time and in another place, they could never have" (Sorce Keller, 1996:62). It is interesting, now, to try to deepen the dynamic by which this process takes place and how it can remain inside a virtuous perspective.

Let us now note the useful distinction proposed by Franco Crespi concerning two terms normally considered synonyms: sense and meaning. This distinction, in the artistic field, can clarify many controversies that have marked the history of art, regarding the "communicative" function of the artworks. According to Crespi, the term *sense* must be understood as *directionality*, a sort of primordial thrust congenital to human nature that perceives the inevitable and confused urgency, over that of an end, also of a purpose. When something is given, sense is given. This push is pre-cultural and informs any subsequent action. The meaning, instead, is a cultural translation, and thus a reduction of the complexity of the original sense that is worthwhile in a given environment, historically and geographically defined.

Through this distinction, the true meaning of disorienting aporia of Igor Stravinsky contained in Conversations with Robert Craft could be, finally, understood: "The music does not mean anything". It is licit, perhaps, to consider music as a language *incapable of meaning* (because then the referentiality of ordinary communication, that of the road signs, would be enough), but extraordinarily *pregnant of sense*: and man is "an animal that inevitably has sense" (Rigotti & Cigada, 2004:25).

5. ART AS INTERCULTURAL POTENTIAL

Beyond the romantic stereotype of the loner and unsociable artist, the creative attitudes, in the texture of the concrete collective life, "are perpetually in search of social frameworks and tend to create "sociality" (Duvignaud, 1967/1969:62) and the artwork can be represented as an expression or "a nostalgia for a lost communion, as forbidden dream incessantly revived by an irrepressible desire for emotional fusion"

(Duvignaud, 1967/1969:62). For the same reason the artist can be seen as the man who

> seeks and sometimes finds in the painting, in the execution of masks, in the music or in the dance, the means to express his sense of isolation [...] an indication of a virtual participation, not yet realized, of which the individual, despite himself, is the source and the matrix (Duvignaud, 1967/1969:54).

Following this perspective, we could consider the artistic production as a communicative dynamic that strives to build interpersonal bonds of a particular type, capable of depth regardless of the direct and mutual knowledge of the participants. Interpersonal bonds able to feed

> that experience of the other that takes place always in the aesthetic practice through those moments of the primary identification such as admiration, shock, emotion, crying, laughter, and that only an aesthetic snobbery can take to vulgar (Rondini, 2002: 155).

Only from these considerations is it possible to reestablish also the sense of those creations that are incomprehensible at first sight, justified only by that "violent dissatisfied need of participation" (Duvignaud, 1967/1969:54), which can be translated into religious, magical, political and especially artistic practices. Artistic communication, as well as having its own peculiar dynamic of meaning, seems also to have a very specific ability to facilitate or create links, relationships, sociability.

One of the risks of contemporary sociology, and the classical one as well, is to construct social reality analysis systems that can function perfectly well without contemplating human action, if not as a mechanism responsive to inviolable laws: the comtian dream of a "social physics" which, appropriately "oiled", removes the error from the system. The outcome is that the social is no longer conceived

> as the place where the human lives. The human is increasingly seen as a character, impulse, stress, disturbance, external "noise" with respect to system of the behaviour, mechanisms and rules that "make" the society (Donati, 2006:22).

Especially in the field of aesthetic and creative disciplines,

> it is a serious mistake to believe that the objectification of value judgments can be achieved by eliminating the subject of assessment, simply starting from the object. This is possible only with

reference to the predispositions of the "primary experience" (Zenck, 1989:105).

It is useful, at this point, to wonder about the properties of this "primary experience", nowadays very shabby. But what is it about? How and where can we find this supposed "primary experience"? For Crespi this level of experience is critical to the distinction between man and animals. In fact, the loss of the instinctual automation caused by thinking marked the definitive break between the two natures. But, since then, this ability to "think", to consider their own experience and not just to live it, compels man to act in a totally own way:

> He is from the beginning constitutively the being that arises questions: "Who am I?", "Where am I going?", "What do I do?", "What is the meaning of life?", "What is there after death?" and so forth (Crespi, 2005:6).

If this is the level at which a man becomes such, then you can also review the concept of culture and art in relation to this perspective. Therefore, culture can be considered as a set of

> response mode, by sensitive men, to the central deep questions that confront the human groups with the consciousness to exist. Those questions are how to deal with death, the meaning of tragedy, the nature of duty, the character of love – these recurring problems, that are, I think, cultural universals, must be found in all societies where men have become aware of existence (Bell, 1977:428).

And so, if scientific knowledge allows undeniable progress on the path of mastery over nature, existential problems remain the same. Even though attempts to answer vary from context to context, all cultures "understand" each other, since they arise in response to common situations" (Bell, 1977:428).

Another aspect to be conceived in this "primary experience", particularly important for its influence on the aesthetic or, more properly, artistic dynamic, is finally detected by Duvignaud where he questions the motives of the creative impulse, or "imaginary". The perpetuation of such "extravagant" dynamic is justified by the consideration that

> if our substance was really given to us, and we had it on hand, undoubtedly we would not project ourselves beyond what limits us. But we are insufficient to ourselves (Duvignaud, 1967/1969:134).

This "failure" is then regarded as an act not cultural, but a structural one and as primary

impulse inherent in man to "project" himself beyond what limits him: the "transcendence". In other words, at this point there is a humanly unavoidable dynamic, an essentially anthropological question. In this perspective, let us now look at the last of these general considerations: how is possible to "outsource" this "primary experience"? Can we consider art as the "least inappropriate" language for this particular type of communication? We must keep in mind, how Crespi does while analysing the thought of Mead, that if it is true that language plays a key role in the formation processes of individuality, it is equally true that "the character, ultimately unobjectifiable of the I, shows a limit to the ability of linguistic definition" (Crespi, 2005:141). Perhaps, just the intention and the artistic endeavour should be placed in this final and total "unobjectifiability" of human experience through the linguistic definitions.

For J. Marothy, if language, writing, conceptual generalization are a great achievement, they can also become a source of strong ambiguity where they claim to exhaust the described object. It is clear, however,

> that the "information" contained in the words brings to the surface only some fragments of a certain object and of our relationship with it; a lot of human meanings remain in the sensory channels, conceptually not generalized, immediately undecodable (Marothy, 1980/1987:120).

Even artists, in the vast majority, are aware of this dynamic. For the poet Giuseppe Ungaretti, for example, experience has shown that between the word and what it actually means there is always a huge gap, even when it seems minimal:

> Language corresponds badly with what you have in mind and with what you would like to say: sure, it does not correspond, if not quite roughly. Therefore, I would say that I was looking for the least inaccurate approximation, reduction, as far as possible, of that unavoidable gap (Camon, 1982:11).

For many scholars, it is this "least inaccurate approximation" to the experience that characterizes the artistic communication. The artistic expression, therefore, intervenes where ordinary communication demonstrates clearly its limits. It compensates an "unavoidable gap" between "perception" and "expression" that seems to irreducibly characterize human experience.

Taking into account the above mentioned, you can go through all the available communicative ways and use increasingly sophisticated and active codes and channels, but in the end, when it comes

to outsource the experience "it is frequent to name the connotation of such experiences as "unspeakable", "ineffable" or "indescribable" (Braga, 1985:121); and yet, despite this obstacle, "our intelligence is organized in a way that we attempt to represent the unrepresentable" (Sloterndijk, 2003:106). In this condition of "linguistic suffering", poetic language

> is what tries the most to escape the need to determine, often using words with different meanings from the current ones, relying on the evocative power of sounds and using the power of allusive terms in unusual contexts (Crespi, 2005:24).

This is, perhaps, the peculiarity and the great opportunity offered by the "artistic communication" compared to any other "ordinary" way to communicate. Artistic communication, in conclusion, is offered to the fruition of contemporary man as a tool for encounter, among the many available, between people of different cultures and traditions, as an opportunity for dialogue that exceeds linguistic constraints, thanks to its unique and structural communicative dynamic "open to the sense": it is, if we reflect, an extremely valuable opportunity in an age that "forces" us to deal globally with *diversity*.

6. THE COMMON GROUND: THE HUMAN

Anthropology, with Lévi-Strauss, argues that the thousands of existing languages are largely mutually unintelligible, but also that, at the same time, "it is possible to translate because they all possess a vocabulary that refers to a universal experience (also if differently cropped by each one)" (Lévi-Strauss, 1993/1997:80). With this statement we fit in the camp of those who, from the classical thought, were called "universals", so much discussed in the modern thought: there would be a universal experience, "differently cropped", but after all directed toward the same "sense", or directionality. Even some current of the linguistic share this "wide" setting:

> Every language projects its own interpretative network on experience, on the world. And yet the extensive production practice shows the possibility of "building" the same sense, using different languages ... the sense lets itself reformulate in another language, even if there is no question of an operation taken for granted (Rigotti & Cigada, 2004:37).

Our proposal is to use the opportunity of a "large mesh" signification that, leaving much

responsibility to the receiver (the famous "gaps" identified by Iser in the artistic texts), at the same time permits appealing to what is common to all, to what we may call *human*, that everyone is able to call up as a dowry received before each subsequent cultural construction. It is in resting our feet (even unconsciously) on this common ground, that each of us can experientially experience in him/herself the capacity to enjoy works from cultures, ages, contexts far removed from our own:

> This discussion leads to the conclusion that there is a human nature that transcends the culture. This idea does not enjoy good press among the human sciences (Boudon, 2008/2009:52).

Yet, when we recognize that we are able to understand the reasons for attitudes so distant from our cultural setting, and also from what we believe "rational" (as magical practices or the many modern superstitions, for example), we have to admit that "what is common among all people, we have" (Boudon, 2008/2009:53): art (cultural product) maintains its value inasmuch as it reflects the structural values that underlie and precede every culture.

We could empirically verify the existence of this "pre-cultural background" common to mankind in a situation characterized by strong cultural differences: a listening guide to the Seventh Symphony of L.V. Beethoven introduced by reading a poem of E. Montale within the Dozza prison of Bologna, on February 4, 2013. The inmates who participated were Italian in least part: the majority of them belonged instead to foreign ethnic groups (Eastern European, Asian, South American, North African) and to different religions (Muslim belief, Catholic, Buddhist, non-believers). Even the Italian language represented a not indifferent cultural barrier for some.

We centered carefully our exposure on to two experiences common "among all men" (to use the expression of Boudon), effectively photographed by Montale in his poem "*Maybe one morning, walking*": the first experience is that of "reflexivity" proper to the human race ("... *I'll turn...*"); the second is the experience of the "fragility" or even of the "inconsistency" ("... *nothing at my back...*"). The passage from the first movement of Beethoven's symphony to the second one, and then the passage from the second movement to the third one exemplified in a highly efficient manner, beyond the great cultural provenance differences, the presence and the comprehensibility of these two elementary and universal experiences, through the essential

mediation of the teacher. Participants were able to share "what is common among all men": artistic language is able to bring out this elementary experience in a particularly effective way. The investee subsequent discussion certificated in an extremely convincing manner this intercultural dynamics: a confirmation that all cultures "understand" each other, since they arise in response to common situations" (Bell, 1977:428).

BIBLIOGRAPHY

1. Attili, G. & Ricci Bitti, P. (1983). *I gesti e i segni*. Roma: Bulzoni.
2. Bell, D. (1977). The return of the Sacred? *British Journal of Sociology*, 28.
3. Borio, G. & Garda, M. (eds.). (1989). *L'esperienza musicale, teoria e storia della ricezione*. Torino: EDT.
4. Boudon, R. [2008] (2009). *Il relativismo*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
5. Braga, G. (1985). *La comunicazione verbale. Una ricerca sociologica*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
6. Calabrese, O. (1986). *Il linguaggio dell'arte*. Milano: Bompiani.
7. Camon, F. (1973). *Il mestiere di scrittore*. Garzanti, Milano.
8. Camon, F. (1982) *Il mestiere di poeta*, Milano: Garzanti.
9. Crespi, F. (2005). *Sociologia del linguaggio*. Roma-Bari: Laterza.
10. Donati, P. (2006). Il significato del paradigma relazionale per la comprensione e l'organizzazione della società: una visione "civile". In P. Donati & I. Colozzi, *Il paradigma relazionale nelle scienze sociali: le prospettive sociologiche*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
11. Duvignaud, J. [1967] (1969). *Sociologia dell'arte*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
12. Eco, U. (1979). *Lector in fabula. La cooperazione interpretativa nei testi narrativi*. Milano: Bompiani.
13. Escarpit, R. [1958] (1977). *Sociologia della letteratura*. Napoli: Guida Editori.
14. Gadamer, H.G. [1960] (1995). *Verità e metodo*. Milano: Bompiani.
15. Gattamorta, L. (2006). Simbolo. In S. Belardinelli & L. Allodi L. (eds.), *Sociologia della cultura*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
16. Gili, G. (2007). Capirsi e non capirsi: il rumore nella comunicazione interpersonale e sociale. In Gruppo SPE-Sociologia per la persona, *La sociologia per la persona. Approfondimenti tematici e prospettive*. Milano: Franco Angeli.
17. Gili, G. & Colombo, F. (2012). *Comunicazione, cultura, società: L'approccio sociologico alla relazione comunicativa*. Brescia: La Scuola.
18. Griswold, W. [1994] (1997). *Sociologia della cultura*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
19. Iser, W. [1971] (1989). Il processo della lettura. Una prospettiva fenomenologica. In R.C. Holub (ed.), *Teoria della ricezione*. Torino: Einaudi. 43-69.
20. Iser, W. [1978] (1987). *L'atto della lettura*. Bologna: Il Mulino.
21. Jiranek, J. (1987). Strati della significazione. In L. Marconi & G. Stefani (eds.), *Il senso in musica*. Bologna: Clueb.
22. Lévi-Strauss, C. [1993] (1997). *Guardare ascoltare leggere*. Milano: Il Saggiatore.
23. Maròthy, J. [1980 (1987). *Musica e uomo*. Milano: Ricordi.
24. McGann, J. [2001] (2002). *La letteratura dopo il Word Wide Web. Il testo letterario nell'era digitale*. Bologna: Bononia University Press.
25. Montaigne, M.E. [1580]. *Saggi*. Milano: Adelphi.
26. Rigotti, E. & Cigada, S. (2004). *La comunicazione verbale*. Milano: Apogeo.
27. Rondini, A. (2002). *Sociologia della letteratura*. Milano: Mondadori.
28. Schutz, A. [1976] (1996). *Frammenti di fenomenologia della musica*. Milano: Edizioni Angelo Guerini e Associati.
29. Sloterdijk, P. (2003). *Ni le soleil ni la mort*. Paris: Pauvert.
30. Sorce Keller, M. (1996). *Musica e sociologia: una breve storia*. Milano: Ricordi.
31. Zenck, M. (1989). Abbozzo di una sociologia della ricezione musicale. In G. Borio & M. Garda (eds.), *L'esperienza musicale, teoria e storia della ricezione*. Torino: EDT.